US targets Iranian ‘shadow fleet’ with sanctions on 35 vessels and entities
The Treasury Department has sanctioned 35 entities and vessels involved in Iran’s ‘shadow fleet’ of tankers that it said ‘play a critical role in transporting illicit Iranian petroleum to foreign markets,’ violating US sanctions.
‘Iran continues to funnel revenues from its petroleum trade toward the development of its nuclear program, proliferation of its ballistic missile and unmanned aerial vehicle technology, and sponsorship of its regional terrorist proxies, risking further destabilizing the region,’ Acting Under Secretary Bradley Smith said in an announcement, 3 December.
The action imposes sanctions under Executive Order 13902 on companies managing vessels that have collectively shipped ‘tens of millions of barrels of oil for Iran,’ Treasury stated. Sanctioned entities include UAE-based Galileos Marine Services, Panama-based Ocean Glory Giant OGG SA, and multiple companies in China, India and other countries.
‘Iran relies upon a sprawling network of tankers and ship management firms in multiple jurisdictions to transport its petroleum to overseas customers — using tactics such as false documentation, manipulation of vessel tracking systems, and constant changes to the names and flags of vessels,’ the notice alleged.
Among the designated vessels, the Marshall Islands-flagged JAYA ‘has carried hundreds of thousands of metric tons of Iranian crude oil on behalf of U.S.-designated China Concord Petroleum Company,’ while the Panama-flagged MASAL transported ‘more than a million barrels of Iranian crude oil’ for sanctioned entities including the National Iranian Oil Company.
The sanctions block all property and interests of the designated persons that are in US jurisdiction and generally prohibit US persons from transactions involving the designated entities.
Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (‘OFAC’) issued a reminder of its sanctions guidance for the maritime industry ‘to aid in identifying new or common fact patterns that may be indicative of sanctions evasion, addressing common counterparty due diligence issues, and implementing best practices to promote sanctions compliance.’
